Voters (Dis)-Believing Digital Political Disinformation in Gubernatorial Election of DKI Jakarta 2016-2017 by Parahita, G. D. (Gilang)
127
Gilang Desti Parahita, Voters (Dis)-Believing Digital Political Disinformation 
in Gubernatorial Election of DKI Jakarta 2016-2017
 Voters (Dis)-Believing Digital Political Disinformation in 
Gubernatorial Election of DKI Jakarta 2016-20171
Gilang Desti Parahita
Department of Communication Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada
(Email: gilang_parahita@ugm.ac.id)
Abstract
Some studies, with regards to the salience of digital disinformation, have focused on investigating 
the tendency to believe disinformation by looking at a single cluster of factors. This study reveals 
factors ranging from multiple clusters, such as socioeconomic status, political partisanship, 
diversity of media exposure, trust in the media, and the digital fluency of the voters. The 
Gubernatorial Election of DKI Jakarta during 2016-2017 provided a context for examining the 
correlation between these factors and the (dis)-belief of digital political disinformation among 
the voters. In the election, the incumbent governor, Basuki Tjahja Purnama, was falsely accused 
of being a communist, which is still a dirty word in Indonesia, by his opponent. A survey was 
conducted for this research, collecting completed questionnaires from 191 citizens of DKI 
Jakarta who had voting rights and could access the online and digital disinformation. The null 
hypothesis was that socioeconomic status, political partisanship, diversity of media exposure, 
trust in the media and digital fluency did not influence the citizens’ perceptions towards digital 
political information. However, the regression analysis found that the null hypothesis should be 
rejected. Of those predictors, political partisanship had the highest significant correlation with 
those perceptions.
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Introduction
In the age of information overload, not 
all political information is accurate and true. 
In the context of Indonesia, where the number 
of social media users is one of the highest 
globally, political hoax that is frequently viral 
through online, has derailed the quality of 
political processes in Indonesia, especially when 
national and local elections are approaching. 
Dis-informed and misinformed public make the 
wrong political decisions. Current regulations 
and fact checkers are unable to accelerate the 
speed of disinformation and misinformation 
penetration. As the audience could have stakes in 
spreading misinformation and disinformation, it 
is important to investigate what factors contribute 
to (dis)-believing digital disinformation.  
There is not much research on the relation 
between several factors that might contribute 
to (dis)-believing disinformation; while, (dis)-
believing information is rarely supported 
only by one factor. Current studies mostly 
focus on assessing an audience’s perception of 
information, by looking at a single predictor, 
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whether it lies in the side of audience, or 
the source of information. At the side of 
individual, some factors including demographic 
characteristics (Gaziano & McGrath, 1985) and 
political partisanships (Feldman, 2011; Ladd, 
2010; Schmitt, Gunther & Liebhart, 2004) might 
relate to the judgment of audience towards 
the credibility of news sources. Apart from 
social and political backgrounds, some studies 
recognized the importance to consider the roles 
of scepticism and cynicism of an audience in 
perceiving news (Lee, 2005; Lee, 2010), while 
others ask why audiences keep watching news 
they distrust (Tsfati & Cappella, 2005). On 
the other hand, at the medium side, trusted 
information might be related to the medium 
type and the storytelling structure (Fico, 
Richardson & Edwards, 2004), topical salience 
in news (Watts et al., 1999), source and apparent 
quality (Austin & Dong, 1994; Burgess, et al., 
2011), and user-generated content in the form 
of comments (Houston, Hansen, & Nisbett, 
2011). Because of the inclination of existing 
research using a single-category of predictor, 
this research intends to reveal that several 
factors might predict the tendency of voters in 
(dis)-believing disinformation. Those factors 
are socioeconomic status, political partisanship, 
diversity of media exposure, trust in news 
media, and digital fluency of voters. 
This research was conducted within the 
context of DKI-Jakarta’s gubernatorial election 
in 2016-2017.2 The reason behind choosing DKI-
Jakarta’s election is the citizens of DKI Jakarta 
represent the diversity of Indonesian people. In 
2 Incumbent governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama or Ahok 
became a candidate in pair with Djarot Saiful Hidayat. 
Besides the pair, other two pairs of candidates were 
nominated in the election. Other pairs were Anies 
Rasyid Baswedan and Salahuddin Uno (Anies-Sandi) 
and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono-Sylviana Murni 
(Agus-Sylvi). Anies-Sandi were supported by Great 
Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerindra) and 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Agus-Sylvi were 
supported by Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), the 
United Development Party (PPP), National Mandate 
Party, and National Awakening Party (PKB).
the mean time, they might also epitomise the low 
levels of Indonesian trust in news media, as well 
as insufficient digital fluency (Edelman, 2017; 
Accenture & Femina, 2017). When this article 
was written, the Ministry of Communication and 
Information (Kominfo) stated that they would 
impose a policy allowing Kominfo to regularly 
announce a hoax through its website (Hutabarat, 
2018). This government’s plan represents that the 
negative impact of disinformation in Indonesia is 
already at an alarming rate, and digital fluency 
of Indonesians is deemed low. 
Secondly, digital disinformation spread 
during the campaign phase of DKI Jakarta 
gubernatorial election. One of the hoaxes was 
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (nicknamed Ahok), the 
incumbent governor of DKI Jakarta in 2016; he 
was linked to the threat of Chinese invasion and 
the revival of communism, and was repeatedly 
accused to be a communist, a term that remains 
unpleasant in Indonesia (Vltchek, 2017; Kwok, 
2017; Kato, 2017). Eventually, Ahok and Djarot 
lost to Anies Baswedan (Anies) and Sandiaga 
Uno (Sandi) in the second round.3 Ahok’s 
success team and political observers believed 
that the loss of Ahok was related to religious 
and ethnic sentiment, which is traceable 
3 Pair of Agus-Sylvi lost in the first round. Some 
considered the loss of Agus-Sylvi was due to the 
excessive intervention of Harimurti’s father, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, the former President of Indonesia. 
The intervention concealed the independence and 
leadership potentials of Harimurti. In the second round, 
Anies-Sandi defeated Ahok-Djarot. The election went in 
two rounds. The loss of Ahok-Djarot from Anies-Sandi 
in the second round was caused by the swing voters 
of Harimurti-Murni gave their votes to Anies-Sandi 
as both pairs have similar identity which is Islamist 
couples, in contrast to Ahok-Djarot. 
 However, it might also be true that the loss of Ahok 
was related to a blasphemy allegation posed to him. A 
doctored video of Ahok saying to a bunch of citizens 
in Jakarta’s Thousand Islands (officially Kepulauan 
Seribu) Administrative Regency, which was “not to be 
‘fooled’ by those who use Al Ma’idah verse 51 of the 
Quran”, spread online, offended some Moslems, and 
stirred up controversy.  Condemning the video, mass 
Islamic protests took place in Jakarta before the first 
round of election or since late October 2016. He was 
then put into trial and lost. 
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since 2012 DKI Jakarta’s election, when the 
sentiment of being “native” Betawi was salient 
and religious identity was confronted (Miichi, 
2014; Nugroho, 2017; Novitasari, 2017; Setijadi, 
2017).4 Thirdly, the salience of grassroot people 
in influencing the public discourse during DKI 
Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in 2012 (Suaedy, 
2014) shows that the online public who have 
vested interest in the election are relatively 
more active, in comparison with many other 
regions of Indonesia.5 
Despite the dominating issues of ethnicity 
and religion sentiment in the case of 2016-17  DKI 
Jakarta’s election, this research aims to uncover 
and compare several types of predictors, ranging 
from socioeconomic, political partisanships, 
media exposure diversity, trust in news media, 
and digital fluency, in their relations to (dis)-
believing digital disinformation. To know which 
factors actually contribute to making the voters 
more gullible to digital disinformation, this 
research conducted a survey to the citizens of 
DKI Jakarta who had voting rights. 
Factors Affecting (Dis)-Believing to Digital 
Disinformation
Disinformation is not new in the sphere 
of politics because the phenomenon can 
be traced back to 1980s when information 
wars occurred and propaganda was used to 
generate power (Hutchinson, 2006). However, 
digital content in the forms of online articles, 
memes, and social media status are spread 
throughout multicentred online world and 
they bombard users without any guarantee 
4  After Ahok - who is typically brash and bluntly 
speaking- was alleged for blasphemy, his electability 
rating plunged from 50% to below 25 % in November 
2016. His political opponents did not convict Ahok 
for blasphemy but they took advantage from the 
conservative Islamist sentiments (Setijadi, 2017).  
5 The voluntary groups, benefiting from the capability of 
online technology, were able to mobilize the citizens to 
participate in the election and monitor the candidates, 
which was much different from money politics-
domination in local elections as usually found in other 
provinces in Indonesia, (Suaedy, 2014). 
that the content has gone through the editorial 
selection as conventionally applied (Flanagin 
& Metzger, 2000; Houston, Hansen, Nisbett, 
2011). Therefore, digital content might contain 
jokes, obsolete information, factual mistakes, 
inaccuracies, rumours, gossips, conspiracies, 
slander, bias, and scientific malpractices 
(Fitzgerald, 1997; Qazvinian, et al., 2011; 
Renard, 2007; Thorson, 2016). Audience 
behaviour that becomes the success key of 
conventional media outlet which is “trust” could 
be counterproductive if it is applied to digital 
disinformation (Arpan & Raney, 2003). Nichols, 
McKinnon & Geary (2016) defined gullibility 
as how far the recipients value truthfulness 
of rumours. This research understands the 
gullibility of Nichols, McKinnon & Geary 
(2016) as the tendency of people to believe 
or disbelieve in disinformation or deception. 
Gullible people to digital disinformation means 
people who tend to evaluate any types of digital 
disinformation as true and correct.
Socioeconomic Status
Audience research has started to consider 
differences in social economic background 
when Katz and Liebes in the 1980s stated that 
media messages were interpreted distinctively 
by different social groups (Mahtani, 2008). 
Some research implemented socio economic 
factors to predict an audience’s trust and 
mistrust of news media (Lee, 2010) and the 
use of traditional and new media (Tran, 2013). 
Many other studies classify level of income 
and education, household size, also status of 
employment into the term of socioeconomic 
status (Wiliams et al., 1997; Shatz, et al., 2003; 
Ritzhaupt et al., 2013). In the context of DKI 
Jakarta’s election, socioeconomic status was 
comprised of levels of income, and education.
Political Partisanship 
Scholars have proposed several meanings 
of partisanship, but this research addresses 
partisanship as political support, affinity 
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and identification of oneself towards certain 
political stand. Although it does not need to 
be expressed formally as party membership, 
it shows commitment (White & Ypi, 2011; 
Sheth, 1971). Some research has shown an 
influential relationship between partisanship 
and information processing (Enns & McAvoy, 
2012). The tradition of Hostile Media Effect 
theory believes that an audience’s evaluation 
towards news content credibility depends 
on one self’s prior-judgment to the media. 
Therefore, if oneself thinks that one news media 
is subjective, a person will see the following 
news content as bias too (Schmitt, Gunthe, 
& Leibhart, 2004; Lee, 2005; Feldman, 2011). 
In reverse, people with political partisanship 
might trust digital disinformation congruent 
to their political beliefs. This research defines 
the political partisanship as self-identification 
to party, political views, and satisfaction to 
incumbent leaders. Political partisanship in 
this research was investigated by looking 
to the opinions of the voters on the religion 
and leadership of Ahok as a governor. Rising 
religious intolerance in Indonesia, echoed by 
radical Moslem groups, prevented Christian-
Chinese Ahok gaining sympathy from voters, 
as it is said that Moslems should not elect non-
Moslem politicians (Kato, 2017). Administrative 
achievement of non-Moslem leaders could then 
suffer from “religious bias” of the voters.
Diversity of Media Exposure 
Media exposure is the quality of audience 
exposed by media content or messages, 
whether remembered well or not (Vreese & 
Neijens, 2016). It includes what part of media 
content they can recall, their recognition of 
media content, attention to media content and 
messages, the frequency of exposure, and even 
their involvement in media such as sharing, 
liking, forwarding and participation (Vreese 
& Neijens, 2016). Types of media content are 
factual information, entertainment, commercial 
and opinion (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000).
Some research has observed a relationship 
between media exposure and audience 
behaviour. Thus, Tsfati (2010) found a positive 
relationship between scepticism and mistrust 
to mainstream media with the frequency of 
alternative online sites. Williams (2012) has 
proved that an audience’s belief of media 
influences their media use, selective exposure, 
and selective attention. In the context of new 
media, cognitive dissonance theory has re-
emerged as a new media environment allowing 
users to select online content that serves 
their existing beliefs to avoid discomfort and 
cognitive dissonance and the theory supports 
homophile/ heterophily paradigm (Shin et al., 
2016; Jang, 2013). 
This research investigated the tendency 
of media exposure diversity factor influencing 
the trust in digital disinformation. It examined 
the perception of media diversity (its type, 
political stances of news media, online formats), 
involvement in political information, and 
homophily/ heterophily in news and social 
media.
Trust in News Media 
Since the 1970s, scholars have investigated 
how audiences perceive source (personal, 
organizational, mass media) and medium 
(print, electronic, online) credibility (Kiousis, 
2001). Williams (2012) proposed trust in media 
and categorized it as trust in information 
and media institution. Metzger et al. (2003) 
defined trust in news media as how the public 
perceives media credibility, which includes 
accuracy, fairness, completeness, reliability and 
trustworthiness. Trust in media mostly refers 
to media credibility theory; while it can also 
mean trust in specific selectivity more than in 
objectivity and truth (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). 
It assumes that when people trust in news 
media, they actually believe in specific selection 
offered by the news media. This research takes 
the stance of Kiousis (2001) and examines types 
of media (print, electronic, or online). 
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Digital Fluency
Digital fluency has become the basic skill 
that people in 21st century should have. It is the 
skill, knowledge framework, contemporary 
fluency and competence needed to assess, 
evaluate, value, synthesize, analyze and 
interpret the information’s bias and integrity 
in the context of digital technology (Miller & 
Bartlett, 2012). It consists of basic knowledge 
about information and communication 
technologies—especially net savviness, skill 
to evaluate critically, and depth and diversity of 
accessed and absorbed information components 
(Miller & Bartlett, 2012). Some research 
investigated the predictors of digital fluency 
(Bologa, Lupu & Saba, 2007; Wang, 2012), and 
the role of digital fluency in identifying digital 
age skills gap (White, 2013). In this research 
context, digital fluency might affect people’s 
trust in (dis)-information.  
Research Question & Hypotheses 
Based on previous theoretical foundation, 
this research poses a main question which is: 
what are the influential factors which affect the 
voter’s trust in digital disinformation? This 
research investigates factors (independent 
variable/IV) affecting (dis)-believing in digital 
political disinformation (dependent variable/
DV) at the individual level. It consists of 
socioeconomic status, political partisanship, 
diversity media exposure, trust in news media 
and digital fluency. 
H0  Socioeconomic factor does not affect the 
trust of the public in digital disinformation. 
H1  Socioeconomic factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
H0  Political partisanship factor does not 
affect the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation. 
H1  Political partisanship factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
H0  Diversity of media exposure factor does 
not affect the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation. 
H1  Divers i ty  media  exposure  fac tor 
significantly affects the trust of the public 
in digital disinformation.
H0  Trust in media factor does not affect the 
trust of the public in digital disinformation. 
H1  Trust in media factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
H0  Digital fluency does not affect the trust of 
the public in digital disinformation. 
H1  Digital fluency factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
What did not have to be answered in 
this research was whether gender or religion 
category has a significant correlation with 
perception to digital disinformation. Both 
categories were investigated limitedly to 
recognize their distributions across the sample.
Methods
Data collection was conducted by 
three enumerators with the assistance of 
Suveymonkey.com. As the questionnaires came 
in digital form, three enumerators were able to 
distribute its link and watch the feedback from 
60-70 respondents from the population. The 
population is DKI Jakarta citizens who have 
valid DKI Jakarta ID-Cards and eligibility for 
voting in 2016-2017 whether they used their 
rights or not. The survey was launched online 
from 15 to 25 July 2017. The enumerators 
directly visited citizens in some districts and 
shared the questionnaire link to them, which 
then went viral and was able to cater 100 
respondents within the first five days. The link 
was closed on the tenth day when the virality 
of the link declined and was fulfilled by 231 
citizens of DKI Jakarta. However, only 191 
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questionnaires fully completed an online via 
Surveymonkey.com. 
Based on the data (Table 1.), most 
respondents were from East Jakarta (36.1%) 
and South Jakarta (26.2 %). North Jakarta 
and West Jakarta shared almost the same 
percentages of respondents (16.2% and 12.6%). 
The smallest percentage of respondents is from 
Thousand Islands (0.5%). It already represents 
the population of DKI Jakarta as reported by 
SUPAS 2015. The gender distribution was also 
consistent with SUPAS 2015 data, which shows 
a balance proportion between male and female 
(Table 2.). 
The respondents are mostly aged 18-
31, followed by 32-46 then 47-61 (Table 3.). 
Table 1. 
Numbers of Population and Sample in Six Districts of DKI Jakarta 
No. Districts
Population
(000 ppl)
Percent of 
Population
Sample
Percent of 
Sample
1 Central Jakarta 913.87 9.00 16 8.4
2 East Jakarta 2,826.66 27.84 69 36.1
3 South Jakarta 1,283.90 21.51 50 26.2
4 West Jakarta 2,293.00 24.23 24 12.6
5 North Jakarta 1,745.82 17.19 31 16.2
6 Thousand Islands 23.31 0.23 1 0.5
7 DKI Jakarta 10,154.34 100 191 100
Source: SUPAS 2015
Table 2.
Gender of Respondents (N=191)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid
Male 93 48.7 48.7 48.7
Female 98 51.3 51.3 100.0
Total 191 100.0 100.0
Source: Research Data
Table 3.
Age of Respondents (N=191)
Age Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
18-31 131 68.6 68.6 68.6
32-46 55 28.8 28.8 97.4
47-61 5 2.6 2.6 100
Total 191 100 100
Source: research data
Table 4. 
Religion of Respondents 
Religion Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Islam 152 79.6 79.6 79.6
Other 39 20.4 20.4 100
Total 191 100 100
Source: research data
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Table 5. 
Independent Factors 
Factor Indicator Questions & Responses
Socioeconomic 
Status
Level of Religiosity Very low, Low, Average, High, Very High 
Level of Education Elementary School Drop Out
Elementary/ Secondary School
Tertiary School
Diploma/ Undergraduate Education
Postgraduate Education
Level of Income in 
Family
Very low, Low, Average, High, Very High
Political 
Partisanship
Political Attitude The religion of the administrative leader of a region does not always 
represent the majority religion in the area. 
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral/No Opinion, Agree, Strongly Agree
Satisfaction to 
Incumbent Leaders
Leadership of Basuki in economy, public health service and education. 
Strongly Dissatisfied, Dissatisfied, Neutral/No Opinion, Satisfied, Very 
Satisfied
Diversity 
of Media 
Exposure 
Diversity of media 
platform, media’s 
political stands, and 
diverse online content. 
I access a diverse media platform (print, electronic, online).
I access news content with diverse political stands.
I access political news that has different political opinions to mine.
I access various online content such as popular news, political opinions 
and Islamic articles.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral/No Opinion, Agree, Strongly Agree
Involvement in 
Political Information
I share political news online to my social media network. 
Never, Sometimes, Average, Often, Always
Homophily/
Heterophily in social 
media 
I always maintain online relationships in social media even if I have 
different political stands with them.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral/No Opinion, Agree, Strongly Agree
Trust in media Credibility of Media 
Types
I trust news media in the form of:
Magazine, dailies, television, radio, online.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree
Digital Fluency Basic Knowledge I have knowledge on how to take online actions according to the 
context.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral/No Opinion, Agree, Strongly Agree.
Source: Adapted from Tran (2013), Shin, et al.,( 2016); Jang (2013); Schmitt, Gunthe, & Leibhart, (2004); 
Lee (2005); Feldman (2011); Miller & Bartlett (2012);  Kiousis (2001).
The divisions of the ages were based on the 
respondents inputs, in which the youngest was 
18 and the oldest was 61 years old. The ages 
were then regrouped into three categories. 
The respondents’ religion was 79.6% 
Islam and the rest other religions (Table 
4.). The categorisation of the religion was 
originally six religions as officially recognized 
in Indonesia. However, the data inputs showed 
that the numbers of respondents which 
belonged to five other religion groups were too 
insignificant to be analysed. Therefore, the data 
was recategorized into two divisions: Islam and 
other than Islam. 
Dependent Variable: (Dis)-Believe in Digital 
Political Disinformation (PD)
The statement to test dependent variable 
is “I believe Ahok is a sympathizer of Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI).” 
Independent Variable (IV)/ Predictors: socioeconomic, 
political partisanship, media exposure, trust in 
media, & digital fluency factors
The tested factors are socioeconomic, 
partisanship, media exposure, trust in media, 
and digital fluency. Some of those factors use 
ordered-category scales (level of income in 
family, level of religiosity, political partisanship, 
diversity of media exposure, and digital 
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fluency), and Likert scale (political partisanship; 
trust in media).
Political partisanship aspect consists of 
political identification, political attitudes, and 
satisfaction to incumbent leaders. Diversity of 
media exposure aspect investigates diversity 
of media platform, involvement to information 
and homophily. Trust in media aspect considers 
the trust of respondents to a variety of media 
platforms. Digital fluency examines the 
perception of respondents on how to use online 
features in different contexts. 
To test the reliability of the data, 
Cronbach’s Alpha is used to sample responses. 
The result shows 0.858, which demonstrates 
high reliability as it is close to 1. 
Table 6.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items
.858 33
      Source: Research Data
This study has some limitations. The 
study was conducted several months after the 
second round of gubernatorial elections of 
DKI Jakarta. Their perceptions toward political 
digital disinformation might have transformed 
before the survey was taken. It could be that they 
trusted them but their beliefs changed after the 
media clarified them. In addition, there was no 
question containing correct information about 
Basuki Tjahja Purnama to test the consistency 
and honesty of respondents’ responses. However, 
respondents were asked about their perceptions 
on some online false information about Basuki 
and they had answered this consistently. Lastly, 
respondents’ answers may not reflect their real 
attitudes and natural behaviour, as they only 
questioned them. 
Results
 Regression analysis is applied to 
socioeconomic, political partisanship, diversity 
of media exposure, trust in media and digital 
fluency towards online false information. Based 
on the data, adjusted R² shows the extent of 
how influential the independent variables on 
the dependent variable are. Therefore, adjusted 
R² are shown in Table 8 as .598 that means all 
independent variables (four variables) have 
an influence of around 60% on the dependent 
variable (DV), which is “Users’ perception in 
online false information.” Moreover, there is 
statistical significance with p values as shown 
in table 9 as 0.000, which is less than 0.05. This 
is the holistic statistics for the DV with all IVs 
and how they affect and influence the users’ 
perceptions in online disinformation.  
Table 7.
Model Summary of All IVs on DV
Model R R Square Adjust. R square Std. Error
1 .773a .598 .534 .62757
Source: Research Data
Note: Predictors: (Constant), Econ, Edu, Rel, PA, 
PP, PS, MD, IPI, TM, TT, TR, Tonline, DF.
Table 8.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares Df
Mean 
Square F
Sig.  
(p value)
Regression 95.614 26 3.677 9.337 .000b
Source: Research Data
Note: Dependent Variable: (Dis)-Believe in Digital 
Political Disinformation (PD)
Predictors: (Constant), Econ, Edu, Rel, PA, PP, PS, 
MD, IPI, TM, TTV, TR, Tonline, DF
Statistical balances were conducted to 
IV’s questions about political attitudes, political 
identity, and homophily/heterophily tendency. 
Statistically balanced statements show that the 
more respondents disagree to the statements, 
the less gullible they are. Meanwhile, other 
questions assume that the more they agree 
to the statements, the less they are gullible 
to online false information. DV’s question 
was also balanced as the respondents who 
are less gullible should answer Disagree or 
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Table 9. 
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
T Sig.(p value)
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.740- .586 -1.262- .209
Religiosity .106 .079 .077 1.349 .179
Economic status .113 .090 .071 1.249 .214
Education .099 .082 .072 1.214 .227
PA1: During all these years I have given my sympathy to 
social organizations showing Islamic identity.
.118 .078 .116 1.523 .130
PA2: I have given sympathy to Islamic Defender Front 
before the Election began.
.293 .072 .335 4.065 .000
PA3: I think the religion of a regional administrative 
leader must represent the majority religion in the area.
-.045- .080 -.047- -.565- .573
PP: I identify myself as a sympathizer of the Islamic party. .028 .088 .020 .320 .749
PS1: Leadership of Basuki as Governor in education sector. .113 .065 .136 1.740 .084
PS2: Leadership of Basuki as Governor in public health 
service.
-.038- .087 -.036- -.441- .660
PS3: Leadership of Basuki as Governor in economic sector. .199 .086 .192 2.302 .023
MD1: I access diverse media platforms (print, electronic, 
and online).
-.041- .086 -.036- -.477- .634
MD2: I access news content with diverse political stands. .048 .107 .040 .455 .650
MD3: I access political news that has different political 
opinions to my own.
.178 .096 .140 1.846 .067
MD4: I access various online content such as popular 
news, political opinions and Islamic articles.
.053 .082 .045 .653 .515
IPI1: I comment on online news articles. -.135- .072 -.140- -1.878- .062
IPI2: I comment to status/post/tweet in social media. .127 .086 .129 1.470 .143
 IPI3: I share a link containing political information. -.124- .077 -.136- -1.616- .108
Homo: I cut off online friendships if they show different 
political stands to me.
-.104- .049 -.115- -2.110- .036
I trust Indonesia’s news media by its format:
TM: Magazine
-.040- .101 -.030- -.393- .694
TP:Print .215 .104 .172 2.059 .041
TTV:Television -.117- .082 -.104- -1.430- .155
TR:Radio .033 .119 .020 .280 .780
Tonline:Online -.107- .075 -.098- -1.422- .157
DF: I have knowledge on how to take online actions 
according to the context.
.147 .067 .130 2.197 .029
PA: Political Attitudes
PP: Political Party Identification
PS : Political Satisfaction
MD: Media Diversity
IPI: Involvement to Political Information
TM: Trust in Magazine
TTV: Trust to Television
TR: Trust to Radio
Tonline: Trust to Online Media
DF: Digital fluency
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Strongly Disagree to the statement: I trust that 
Basuki Tjahja Purnama is sympathizer of the 
Indonesian communist party.
Socioeconomic Factors
The hypotheses for socioeconomic factors 
are:
H0  Socioeconomic factor does not affect the 
trust of the public in digital disinformation. 
H1  Socioeconomic factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
Socioeconomic factor consist of level of 
economy/income in the family,  and  education. 
The independent variable is perception to 
political digital disinformation (PD). Results 
show that socioeconomic factor relatively 
affects people’s perceptions in political digital 
disinformation where adjusted R² is 9% as 
indicated in Table 11. The null hypothesis 
is rejected as p value is 0.001, which is less 
than 0.05 as shown in Table 12. Therefore, an 
alternative hypothesis is accepted.
Table 10.
Model Summary of Socioeconomic Factor
Model R R Square Adjust. R square
Std. 
Error
1 .302a .091 .071 .88634
Source: research data. 
Note: Predictors: (Constant), Econ, Edu 
Table 11. 
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares Df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Regression 14.622 4 3.655 4.653 .001b
Source: research data. Dependent Variable: PD 
Note: Predictors: (Constant), Econ, Edu
Political Partisanship
The hypotheses are:
H0 Political partisanship factor does not 
affect the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation. 
H1  Political partisanship factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
Political partisanship consists of political 
attitudes (PA), party identification (PI) and 
political satisfaction to incumbent (PS). Results 
showing that political partisanship factor affects 
people’s perceptions in online disinformation 
significantly where adjusted R² is 43 % as 
indicated in Table 13.  The null hypothesis 
is rejected as p value is 0.000, which is less 
than 0.05 as shown in table 14. Therefore, an 
alternative hypothesis is accepted.
Table 12.
Model Summary of Political Partisanship
Model R R Square Adjust. R square Std. Error
1 .676a .457 .436 .69079
Source: Research Data
Note: Predictors: (Constant), PP, PS2, PA3, PS1, 
PA1, PS3, PA2                                                                    
                                                                       
Table 13.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares Df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Regression 73.417 7 10.488 21.979 .000b
Source: Research Data
Note: Dependent Variable: PD 
Predictors: (Constant), PP, PS2, PA3, PS1, PA1, 
PS3, PA2
Diversity of Media Exposure
The hypotheses are:
H0  Media exposure factor does not affect the 
trust of the public in digital disinformation. 
H1 Media exposure factor significantly affects the 
trust of the public in digital disinformation.
Diversity of media exposure encompasses 
the diversity of access to media and political 
stands of accessed media (MD), involvement 
in political information (IPI), and homophily/
heterophily tendency (Homo). 
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Results that pair DV with only the 
diversity of media exposure factor show that 
this factor affects people’s perceptions in online 
disinformation relatively, in which adjusted R² 
is 10 % as indicated in Table 15. So this factor 
is not as influential as political factor. The null 
hypothesis is rejected as p value is 0.001, which 
is less than 0.05 as shown in Table 16. Therefore, 
an alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table 14.
Model Summary of Diversity of Media 
Exposure
Model R R Square Adjust. R square Std. Error
1 .371a .138 .100 .87267
Note: Predictors: (Constant), MD1, MD2, MD3, 
MD4, IPI1, IPI2,  IPI3, Homo                                    
Table 15. 
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares Df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Regression 22.142 8 2.768 3.634 .001b
Source: research data. Note. Dependent Variable: PD 
Predictors: (Constant), Homo, MD3, MI1, MD1, 
MD4, MI3, MD2, MI2
Trust in Media
The hypotheses for trust in media factor.
H0  Trust in media factor does not affect the 
trust of the public in digital disinformation. 
H1 Trust in media factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
Results that pair DV with only trust 
in media factor show that this factor affects 
people’s perceptions in online disinformation 
relatively, in which adjusted R² is 9% as 
indicated in Table 16. So this factor influence 
is in the same scale with socioeconomic 
and diversity of media exposure regarding 
influence on the DV. The null hypothesis 
is rejected as p value is 0.000, which is less 
than 0.05 as shown in Table 18. Therefore, an 
alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table 16. 
Model Summary of Trust in Media
Model R R Square Adjust. R square Std. Error
1 .340a .115 .091 .87649
Source: research data. 
Note: Predictors: (Constant), TOnline, TM, TR, 
TTV, TP
Table 17.
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares Df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Regression 18.456 5 3.691 4.805 .000b
Source: research data. Note. Dependent Variable: PD
Note:  Predictors: (Constant), TOnline, TM, TR, 
TTV, TP
Digital Fluency
The hypotheses are:
H0  Digital fluency does not affect the trust of 
the public in digital disinformation. 
H1  Digital fluency factor significantly 
affects the trust of the public in digital 
disinformation.
Results that pair DV with only digital 
fluency factor show that this factor affects 
people’s perceptions in online disinformation 
relatively, in which adjusted R² is almost 12% as 
indicated in Table 19. So also this factor influence 
is not as influential as political factor. The null 
hypothesis is rejected as p value is 0.000, which 
is less than 0.05 as shown in Table 20. Therefore, 
an alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table 18.
Model Summary of Digital Fluency
Model R R Square Adjust. R square Std. Error
1 .349a .122 .117 .86418
Source: research data
Note:  Predictors: (Constant), TOnline, TM, TR, 
TTV, TP
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Table 19. 
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares Df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Regression 19.599 1 19.599 26.243 .000b
Source: research data. 
Note: Dependent Variable: PD 
Predictors: (Constant), DF
Discussion
 Recent studies concerning the issue 
mostly limitedly considered factors from the 
same category to predict trust or distrust 
of information. Given the lack of research 
regarding voters’ perceptions towards online 
disinformation, this study has identified some 
of the factors drawing from diverse factors 
rooted from demographic background, political 
stand, and media issues. In DKI Jakarta’s 
gubernatorial election in 2017, political digital 
disinformation was used to test the gullibility 
of respondents in regard to false information 
about Basuki Tjahja Purnama as a member to 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The main 
idea of the research was to observe what factors 
have actually shaped DKI Jakarta’s voters in 
believing or disbelieving in the disinformation, 
whether socioeconomic, political partisanship, 
diversity of media exposure, trust in news 
media, and digital fluency. 
Generally, of all factors, the researcher 
found that the most significant one was found 
in political partisanship, while the least one was 
in socioeconomic. In political partisanship, we 
intended to prove whether political supports 
to “Islamic groups or party” might affect the 
perceptions to online political disinformation 
in the way that they tend to believe it. Based 
on the data, the respondents who showed 
more tolerance to social diversity and were 
satisfied by the leaderships of Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama in economy, public health service 
and education tended to disbelieve that Basuki 
was a sympathizer of PKI. To say it in other 
way, respondents who might have had no 
prior support of Basuki and the nationalist 
party were inclined to trust disinformation 
that was in accordance to their beliefs. On the 
other hand, socioeconomic status, consisting of 
levels of income in the family and education, 
was less likely influence the trust to digital 
disinformation. The data showed that political 
partisanship affected people’s perception 
towards news by 45%; while others were 
influential, ranging in their influence by only 
9% (socioeconomic), 10% (diversity of media 
exposure), and 11% (digital fluency) of R 
square.  
Regarding the results, to predict which 
social groups are more gullible to political 
digital disinformation, we can detect them 
by seeing to what extent the sameness of 
perspectives between the pre-existing belief, 
or value, of the receiving social groups and 
the underlying political stand of the shared 
disinformation. For example, if someone has 
prior credence that the Chinese are closely 
related to communism, they would be prone 
to believe that Ahok was a member of the 
communist party. In other words, people tend 
to believe any information that confirms their 
already-held beliefs or bias views. 
The diversity of media exposure factors 
comprised of diversity of accessed media itself 
and involvement in political information, 
and homophily/ heterophily tendencies. We 
found that voters who accessed various media 
platforms and online contents, loved to share 
political information to their online network, 
and maintained the diversity of voices on 
their online network did not easily believe 
false information. This result is consistent with 
Tsfati (2010) who found that the more people 
distrusted mainstream media, the more likely 
they were to access alternative online sites. 
In the context of this study, the respondents 
diversely accessed all types of media platforms, 
all kinds of online sites, and even did not 
hesitate to access news media with a different 
political opinions from them.
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Trust in media means how far people 
can perceive the credibility of media. In this 
research, respondents were asked about 
their perceptions towards media platforms; 
namely, magazine, daily, television, radio and 
online. It seems that the respondents who 
have more trust in the media are more inclined 
to disbelieve online false information. The 
result shows that most respondents have been 
judging that popular news media platforms 
were more credible than information shared 
via social media, instant messaging and taking 
forms of memes.
Digital fluency is understood as the 
ability of using acting on digital and online 
technology in a different context. Gullibility to 
online hoax has been believed to be related to 
low digital fluency. This study confirmed that 
respondents who perceived themselves having 
higher digital fluency tended to be sceptical to 
digital disinformation. This is for the reason 
that they might be competent to criticize, 
interrogate and compare any information they 
receive. Thus, respondents in this research, 
with a higher rate of self-perception on digital 
fluency did not believe that Ahok had any 
relations with PKI. Therefore, taken into a 
wider context, analytical thinking is required 
to debunk disinformation. 
P o l i t i c a l  d i s i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d 
misinformation are not new to the digital 
world, but their spread and impact on political 
processes are tremendous, as seen in the 
experience of Indonesia’s local politics. Based 
on the research result, the spread of the hoax 
and severity of the impact might more highly 
relate to the political partisanship of DKI 
Jakarta’s voters, in contrast to other factors. 
Having said that, alleviating the spread of 
political hoax in digital era, for example, by 
arresting disinformation producers, is not a 
sufficient measure, as prior political stands 
play a more important role in the mind of 
the receivers on believing or disbelieving 
disinformation. 
Considering a wider context of Indonesia, 
increasing trust to news media, varying media 
exposure, and improving digital literacy skills 
might be less effective to prevent believing 
hoax, than to change the political stands of the 
Indonesian voters themselves. Although voters 
could be exposed to various types and content 
of media or news sources, this will not assure 
they could grasp a plethora political stands to 
compare information since cross ownerships of 
media in Indonesia lead to single political voices 
in the editorials of conglomerated media. Digital 
literacy skills of the voters might not be able to 
prevent them in disbelieving disinformation. 
Even though they could differentiate a hoax, if 
the hoax is in accordance to their pre-existing 
belief, they might believe it. Nevertheless, 
aforementioned solutions remain relevant to be 
applied as socioeconomic factor, in this research, 
did not show significant relations to the gullibility 
of voters to the digital hoax, meaning that 
someone better or lesser in educational levels 
did not indicate their inclination to believe or 
disbelieve disinformation.
The research result showing that DKI 
Jakarta’s voters who were unlikely to give 
sympathy to non-Moslem leaders and tended to 
believe online hoaxes, is actually in accordance 
with the salient phenomena of intolerance to 
minority groups like LGBTI, Shia Moslems 
and Ahmadiyah in other regions of Indonesia 
(Nugroho, et.al., 2012). Thus, in the context of 
the presidential election scheduled for 2019, 
radical and intolerant Islamic views published 
online could overshadow the rationality 
of voters, sharpen social segregation, blow 
the echo chamber, and pose a threat to the 
credibility and integrity of election committee. 
A non-corrupt and reform-minded leader could 
be secondary to the religion, ethnicity and race 
of the leaders. This seems to be true, as recently 
Joko Widodo has announced to run for the 2019 
presidential candidacy with Ma’ruf Amin, a 
hard-line cleric and the chairman of Indonesian 
Ulema Council (MUI). 
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Conclusion
Scholarly attention to the spread of 
false information through online and digital 
channels has risen. Although this is an old 
issue in a new form, and though the internet 
has existed for more than two decades, this 
problem has caused social and political turmoil 
in societies, not to mention in Indonesia. 
This research focused on examining the 
individual or audience level factors that may be 
related to the spread or anticipation of digital 
disinformation phenomena. Especially when 
false information exploits intolerance to ethnic, 
religious, skin colour groups and identities, its 
spread and emergence must be contained and 
anticipated. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate 
the predicting factors of gullibility, whether it 
lies on socioeconomic, political partisanship, 
trust in media, diversity of media exposure or 
on digital fluency. Based on the study, the last 
four factors tended to affect the perceptions 
towards the false information in 2016-17 DKI 
Jakarta’s gubernatorial election. Of those major 
factors, political partisanship was the most 
influential factor on predicting gullibility. In 
this study, political partisanship was defined 
as the voters’ tolerance and satisfaction of a 
governor who followed a religion other than 
Islam. The data shows that there was a strong 
correlation between the political stand and 
tendency to believe disinformation. This result 
supports the idea that people might trust 
disinformation as long as it echoes certain pre-
existing belief.
This study fills the gap in the scholarship 
focusing on the perceptions of voters on digital 
information, which mostly used factors from 
the same category, while this research took 
demographic background, political stand, and 
media issues as considerations in predicting 
trust or distrust to disinformation. As this study 
has indicated, further examination should be 
conducted on the issue of political partisanship 
formation in relation to perceptions to online 
disinformation. As information clarifying hoax 
might be ineffective to change voters’ beliefs on 
disinformation, further studies can investigate 
the influence of community, peer group, social 
class, and opinion leaders in the formation 
and alteration of political partisanship and 
debunking online disinformation. 
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